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IN REPLY REFER TO

OPNAVINST 11300.6A  
N442

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OPNAV INSTRUCTION 11300.6A

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: POLICY FOR THE SECURITY OF ENERGY AND UTILITIES AT NAVAL  
ACTIVITIES

Ref: (a) Defense Energy Program Policy Memorandum (DEPPM) 92-1  
of 14 Jan 92 (NOTAL)

Encl: (1) Definitions  
(2) Vulnerability Analysis and Remedial Action Plan  
Guidance

1. Purpose. To implement procedures which will incorporate the lessons learned from natural disasters and enhance the security of utilities at naval activities. This is a major revision of the basic instruction and should be reviewed in its entirety.

2. Cancellation. OPNAV Instruction 11300.6.

3. Background. Energy is a key ingredient of national security. An adequate, reliable supply of energy is essential to the performance of military missions. This instruction implements reference (a) and updates energy security policy for Department of Navy organizations and activities. This update is based on experiences gained during recent disasters, including the Loma Prieta earthquake and Hurricane Hugo of 1989. This instruction reemphasizes the need for energy security plans at the activity level.

4. Policy. It is a basic responsibility of major claimants and commanders to understand the vulnerability of their missions and facilities to energy disruptions and to assess the risk of such disruptions, whether the energy source is internal or external to the command. It is essential to take action to eliminate critical energy support vulnerabilities.

5. Responsibilities

a. Major Claimants will: (1) conduct energy vulnerability analyses and regularly review them for currency; (2) assist activities in establishing energy emergency preparedness



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
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and operation plans; and (3) develop and execute remedial action plans to remove unacceptable energy security risks.

b. Activities will establish and maintain: (1) a technically accurate data base on its portable emergency generators and (2) a method for employing or transferring these assets within their organizations or across Service/Agency lines in an energy emergency.

6. Actions. Activities will establish schedules and procedures for their organizations to perform the analyses and develop energy emergency preparedness and operation and remedial action plans using definitions in enclosure (1). Analyses will be performed at the lowest organizational activity feasible, consistent with capabilities. Vulnerability analyses, energy emergency preparedness and operation plans, and remedial action plans will address the factors in enclosure (2). Analyses will include liaison with public utilities and other off-base service providers to ensure critical base missions are recognized in the service restoration plans of those providers. Assistance with analyses and planning will be provided, within available capabilities, by Engineering Field Divisions of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command.



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## DEFINITIONS

1. Energy. Conventional energy such as coal, petroleum products, steam and/or hot water, electricity, natural gas and propane, and (as appropriate) including military operational fuels and propellants, whether purchased or generated/produced by Department of Defense (DOD), but excluding nuclear energy used in ship propulsion.

2. Critical Energy Requirements. Those functions which require a continuous supply of energy during an emergency. Those functions may include housing, life safety/health (e.g., hospitals), public safety (e.g., police and fire departments), communications, environmental systems, and critical mission support.

3. Energy Emergency Preparedness and Operations Plan. A document indicating the steps to be undertaken at an activity to prepare for and recover from an energy emergency.

4. Remedial Action Plan. A document indicating corrective actions required to remove unacceptable risks from potential failure of energy systems, and the planning, programming, and budgeting actions necessary to implement the corrections.

5. Risk. The chance or probability that a given level of vulnerability will be experienced.

a. Acceptable Risk. Risk of energy supply losses which can be tolerated or mitigated to the extent that an organization can perform its basic mission.

b. Objective Risk Factors. These include natural hazards, such as storms, and accidents that damage source, storage, or distribution facilities.

c. Subjective Risk Factors. These include potential deliberate acts, such as sabotage, to destroy energy supplies or systems.

Enclosure (1)

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d. Unacceptable Risk. An estimate that energy supply interruptions are both reasonably likely and cannot be sufficiently mitigated or tolerated to permit the affected organization(s) to perform.

6. Supplier. The military activity that provides utility services to all tenants of an activity.

7. Utilities Energy. Energy supplies for facilities, including electricity, natural gas, coal, steam/hot water, propane and fuel oil; excluding mobility fuel.

8. Vulnerability. The degree to which an organization's mission or activity depends on the availability of a specific energy supply or service. Synonym: dependence. Dependence is not, in itself, cause for corrective action (see "unacceptable risk").

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## VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS AND REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN GUIDANCE

The following lists the minimum factors to be considered when performing the analyses. The factors are written generically for all energy types, although some clearly do not apply in all situations. Facility energy supplies that are directly dependent upon the performance of public utilities will, for example, be analyzed differently from military supply systems for petroleum products or energy supplied from facilities entirely within the bounds of an activity.

The goal is to create an Energy Vulnerability Analysis, an Energy Emergency Preparedness and Operations Plan for operating under emergency conditions, and, if required, a Remedial Action Plan, for each activity. It is recommended that each activity create an Energy Security Planning Board (ESPB). The utilization of an ESPB, with the activity commander or designated representative as chairperson and representation from each tenant/command, will help to ensure a coordinated planning and recovery effort.

1. Vulnerability Analyses will:

a. Define critical energy requirements, the facilities driving and supporting the requirements. The collection of this level of data will help to allocate funding and manpower resources, both for planning of remedial actions and for recovery during an energy emergency.

b. Evaluate vulnerabilities to energy supply losses to determine potential objective and subjective risks of energy supply disruptions. Unacceptable risks require corrective action. Distinguishing between objective and subjective factors may help indicate the type of remedial action, the likelihood of successfully coping with the risk factor and, in some cases, the type of public authority most appropriate for dealing with the risk element.

c. Define customer/tenant responsibilities. Each tenant will specifically identify the energy requirements essential for continued operation and why, in priority order. Example: a tenant with operations controlling computer equipment may require power for the computer, but not the lights.

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d. Define supplier responsibilities. Those responsibilities should include identification of distribution system vulnerabilities, the impact of system failure, and the remedial action necessary to ensure system operation based on the level of recovery dictated by the requirement. The supplier should assess portable emergency generator needs, by location and size, and initiate action to obtain the equipment or develop the means to transport it to its emergency location, if on hand elsewhere. The supplier should also evaluate physical security vulnerabilities, as they relate to energy security, and take mitigating action. Consideration should be given to the availability of manpower and equipment from other military and federal government sources and action taken to arrange for the provision of such resources, including the logistic support required while on station.

2. Energy Emergency Preparedness and Operations Plans will:

a. Contain procedures for the execution of critical activity missions if the energy supply is lost. These plans may include movement to an alternate location, performance of tasks manually, provision of back-up power by tenant or host, etc. The supplier and each tenant should also finalize personnel recall procedures, complete with personnel emergency work assignments and the method of contact, particularly when public communications systems are not operational.

b. Identify critical energy requirements to the public utilities for integration into their service restoration plans. Ensure existing utility service contracts contain emergency support contingency clauses.

c. Identify communication channels between the activity, other DOD and Federal authorities, and state and local emergency officials. Assign and coordinate the radio frequencies to be used during the recovery effort. Additionally, communication channels between the activity and intelligence officials should also be identified.

d. Identify installed emergency generators and inventory by location, size, and fueling requirement. Ensure each generator, installed as well as portable, is receiving necessary preventive

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maintenance and testing, in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations, and that all operators are designated and trained annually to operate the equipment. An emergency fueling plan for all generators should be developed and coordinated directly with the fuel supplier.

e. Ensure Mutual Aid agreements have been negotiated, as necessary, with state and local officials, as well as the servicing public utilities, to assist in the activity's recovery and to minimize loss of life in the outlying communities.

f. Ensure that information reported to Service/Agency equipment managers on emergency utility and other types of equipment are kept current and accurate.

g. Identify local sources of labor, material, and equipment, as well as off-base energy providers other than public utilities, for use in the recovery operations.

h. Provide for annual training to management personnel on the details of the emergency plan and the specific procedures they must follow.

i. Facilitate review of construction projects for adequate energy security planning/as well as for consideration of the impact the project will have on the existing recovery plan.

3. Remedial Action Plans will:

a. Prioritize unacceptable risks and set milestones to correct them. The ESPB shall establish cost/benefit criteria for the analysis of these actions, where such do not already exist. All remedial action plans will include liaison with public utilities and other off-base service providers to ensure critical base missions are recognized in the service restoration plans of those providers.

b. Provide for budgeting when significant expenditures are required to effect remedial actions.

c. Specify at least annual review of milestones.